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  The	  dead	  have	  been	  doing	   the	  rounds	  during	  recent	  weeks.	  Their	   inert	  blood	  has	  been	  pumped	  through	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   nation,	   a	   nation	   rebirthed	   annually	   live	   from	   the	   ‘sacred	   grounds’	   of	  Gallipoli.	   This	   year	   a	   rare	   moment	   intervened	   into	   John	   Howard’s	   bulldozer	   rhetoric	   from	   the	  story	   of	   an	   Adelaide	   VCE	   student,	   Donna	   Handke,	   from	   Mount	   Barker	   High	   School.	   Handke	  researched	   five	   dead	   Ngarrindjerri	   Anzacs	   who	   volunteered	   from	   the	   Point	  McLeay	   Aboriginal	  Mission—largely,	  it	  seems,	  to	  receive	  wages	  instead	  of	  rations.	  She	  followed	  up	  on	  the	  research	  of	  Ngarrindjerri	  historian	  Dr	  Doreen	  Kartinyeri,	  raised	  funds	  for	  a	  class	  trip	  to	  Belgium	  and	  located	  the	  grave	  of	  Private	  Rufus	  Rigney.	  She	  and	  her	  classmates	  spread	  sand	  on	  Rigney’s	  grave	  from	  his	  country,	  Raukkan,	  and	  collected	  soil	  for	  his	  relatives,	  which	  they	  cleansed	  and	  cast	  into	  the	  waters	  of	  the	  Coorung.1	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Handke’s	   story	   resonates	  with	   Stephen	  Muecke’s	   book,	  Ancient	   and	  Modern:	   Time,	   Culture	  
and	   Indigenous	   Philosophy,	   in	   which	   he	   hopes	   to	   be	   a	   ‘helpmeet’	   (167)	   to	   an	   indigenous	  philosophy.	  He	  writes,	   ‘the	  affirmation	  of	  new	   forms	  of	  Australian	  cultural	   life	  would	  mean	   that	  the	  national	  dead	  will	  become	  increasingly	  the	  Aboriginal	  dead’.	  (65)	  Muecke	  is	  interested	  in	  the	  symbolic	   resurrection	   of	   the	   dead	   for	   the	   nation.	   But	   he	   is	   posing	   a	   challenge	   not	   just	   to	   the	  amnesia	   surrounding	   the	   devastation	   of	   Aboriginal	   populations:	   Muecke’s	   book	   articulates	   the	  presence	  of	  the	  ancient	  to	  the	  modern.	  This	  guides	  Ancient	  and	  Modern	  from	  the	  historical	  shift	  of	  Henry	   Reynold’s	   documentary	   record	   toward	   the	   epistemological	   ‘renovation’	   implied	   by	   an	  indigenous	  philosophy.	  Among	  other	  things,	  an	  indigenous	  philosophy	  would	  reconsider	  time	  and	  space	  within	  a	  heuristic	  of	  place.	  	  Immersed	   in	   place	   and	   body,	   Muecke’s	   book	   is	   an	   unsettling	   and	   disorienting	   work,	   its	  argument	  deviating	   through	   the	   still-­‐largely	  uncharted	  pedagogic	  mediums	  of	   footsteps,	   chance	  encounters,	   morning	   coffee,	   memories	   and	   dreams.	   In	   the	   same	   way	   that	   its	   cover	   knowingly	  comments	  on	  colonial	  appropriation	  and	  romanticism	  of	  the	  ‘primitive’,	  Ancient	  and	  Modern	  is	  the	  ‘sexy	  and	  dangerous’	  assemblage	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  indigenous	  antiquity	  in	  Australian	  modernity,	  from	  the	  acknowledged	  standpoint	  of	  an	  ‘outsider’,	  a	  white	  scholar.	  Being	  a	  white	  scholar	  myself,	  any	  questions	  hovering	  over	  this	  vantage	  are	  better	  posed	  by	  indigenous	   scholars.	   However,	   in	   his	   acknowledgements	   Muecke	   addresses	   the	   indigenous	  communities	   from	   whom	   he	   neither	   ‘borrows’	   nor	   ‘gives’	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	   indigenous	  philosophy.	   He	   does	   more	   than	   acknowledge	   indigenous	   scholars—Paddy	   Roe	   was	   his	   ‘first	  mentor’.	  Through	  dialogue	  he	  wants	   to	  replace	  an	  ethnographic	  view	  of	   indigenous	  knowledges	  and	  practices	  with	  that	  of	  a	  cultural	  analyst	  or	  ‘cultural	  worker’.	  Muecke	  writes:	  Being	  a	  philosopher	  in	  an	  Aboriginal	  community,	  we	  find	  will	  be	  a	  quite	  different	  thing	  from	  being	  a	  social	  scientist	  there.	  The	  philosopher	  is	  not	  on	  the	  lookout	  for	  information	  to	  take	  home,	  he	  or	  she	  is	  alert	  for	  concepts	  which	  by	  their	  nature	  are	  generalisable.	  (68)	  	  The	  Aboriginal	  community	  that	  Muecke	  seeks	  dialogue	  with	  is	  not	  to	  be	  found	  in	  his	  book	  ‘there’	  in	  the	  ethnographer’s	  outback	  camp.	  Half	  way	  through	  the	  book,	  Muecke	  recounts	  a	  discussion	  he	  had	  with	  Jackie	  Huggins	  at	  the	  Defence	  Force	  Academy	  in	  1997	  about	  whether	  he	  should	  continue	  with	   a	   book	   on	   Aboriginal	   philosophy.	   Huggins	   ‘kind	   of,	   tentatively’	   said	   yes,	   but	  Muecke	   then	  quotes	   her	   position	   on	   knowledge	   relations	   not	   from	   this	   exchange,	   but	   from	   a	   1983	   piece	   in	  
Australian	   Historical	   Studies.	   (104)	   Here	   Huggins	   categorically	   rejects	   the	   imposition	   of	   non-­‐Aboriginal	   writers	   defining	   Aboriginality.	   Perhaps	   this	   important	   qualifying	   quote	   appears	  belatedly	  because	  by	  now	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  Muecke	  is	  experimenting	  with	  ways	  to	  generalise,	  without	   defining,	   concepts	   that,	   if	   not	   inextricable	   from	   language,	   law	   and	   land,	   remain	   in	  Aboriginal	   custodianship.	   Nevertheless,	   Huggins’s	  words	   cry	   out	   for	   a	   response,	  which	  Muecke	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seems	   to	   evade	  while	  musing	   about	   the	   processes	   for	   the	   disclosure	   of	   Aboriginal	   knowledges,	  then	   turning	   to	   the	   compromised	   medium	   of	   the	   book,	   as	   a	   ‘whitefella	   artifact’.	   (105)	   He	   poses	  questions	   about	   teaching	   indigenous	   authors,	   advocates	   increasing	   indigenous	   literature,	   and	  over	   the	  page	  he	   adds,	   ‘there	   is	   no	   indigenous	   content	  waiting	   to	  pour	   into	   any	   available	   form,	  such	  as	   the	  genres	  of	  English,	  which	  would	  remain	  untransformed	  by	   that	  process’.	   (106)	  But	   the	  transformations	  are	  yet	  to	  manifest.	  Perhaps	  precisely	  because	  this	  is	  an	  innovative	  broaching	  of	  distinct	  and	  sometimes	   imbricated	  practices	  of	  knowing,	  Muecke	   is	  mindful	  of	  Huggins’s	  words,	  but	  still	  unable	  to	  give	  a	  response.	  
Ancient	  and	  Modern	  draws	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘milieu’,	  as	  medium	  and	  middle,	  to	  approach	  the	  in	  between	  of	  the	  artificially	  distinguished	  realms	  of	  the	  ancient	  and	  the	  modern.	  The	  undertaking	  of	  the	  book	  is	  to	  make	  something	  redemptive	  of	  the	  haunting	  of	  an	  indigenous	  ancient	  through	  ‘a	  new	  Australian	  modernism	  [which]	  connects	  along	  multiple	  lines	  with	  indigenous	  antiquity’.	  (48)	  These	  are	  not	  lines	  of	  historical	  continuity,	  but	  more	  akin	  to	  the	  layering	  of	  social	  and	  ontological	  formations,	  from	  the	  tribal	  to	  the	  postmodern,	  that	  Paul	  James	  explores	  in	  his	  forthcoming	  Global,	  
Nationalism,	   Tribalism.2	   This	   has	   the	   welcome	   political	   effect,	   particularly	   within	   a	   broader	  context	   of	   assimilation	   revivalism,	   of	   tripping	   the	   trajectory	   of	   racial	   destiny:	   ‘To	   accept	  indigenous	   modernity	   is	   to	   refuse	   the	   idea	   of	   aspiration	   to	   that	   modernity	   some	   time	   in	   the	  future’.3	  
Ancient	   and	   Modern	   wants	   to	   confound	   the	   primitive	   as	   a	   counterpoint	   to	   modernity,	   by	  proposing	   an	   indigenous	  modernity,	   as	   ‘a	   predisposition	   to	   (both)	   resistance	   and	   adaptation	   to	  the	   rapid	   changes	   introduced	   by	   invasion	   and	   colonisation’.4	   Indigenous	   responses	   to	  colonisation—from	   ‘compliance	   and	   collaboration,	   resistance	   and	   inventive	   adaptation’—differentiated	   power	   and	   developed	   ‘new	   forms	   of	   language	   and	   culture	   that	   involve	   lots	   of	  translation	   work’.5	   This	   rather	   agitates	   the	   conventional	   uses	   of	   modernity.	   Muecke	   writes,	  ‘Maybe	   they	   were	   already	   modern	   in	   ways	   whitefellas	   don’t	   have	   words	   for’.6	   Perhaps	   if	   the	  unsettled	   and	   disoriented	   settler	   population	   had	   been	   a	   little	  more	   adaptable	   themselves	   their	  unwillingness	   to	   translate	   might	   not	   have	   meant	   our	   loss	   of	   sustainable	   land	   management	  knowedges.	  As	  Muecke	  points	  out,	  the	  challenge	  to	  western	  mapping	  and	  usage	  of	  space,	  wrought	  by	   a	   thinking	   specific	   to	   place,	   is	   bringing	   global	   indigenous	   and	   ecological	   movements	   into	  intersection.	  In	   the	  absence	  of	   indigenous	  participants,	  however,	   I’ve	  known	  white	  environmentalists	   to	  risk	  a	  romanticism	  that	  Warwick	  Anderson	  traces	  back	  to	   the	  physical	  anthropologist	  Frederick	  Wood	   Jones	   (among	  others),	   and	  his	   interest	   in	   the	  Australian	  Aboriginal	   as	   a	   ‘dark	  Caucasian’.	  This	  proved	  a	  distinct	  racial	  vocation	  and	  pathway,	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  modern	  white	  degeneracy,	  and	   also	   exemplified	   ‘an	   ethical	   relationship	   to	   place’.	   By	   the	   1930s	   the	   Adelaide	   writers,	   the	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Jindyworobaks,	  adopted	  this	  line	  of	  thinking	  and	  effectively	  licensed	  the	  primitive	  ‘as	  a	  site	  for	  the	  expression,	   by	   some	   European	   Australians,	   of	   alternative	   modern	   possibilities’.7	   All	   this	   might	  have	  had	  more	  credibility	  had	  it	  been	  linked	  to	  the	  understanding	  that	  connecting	  to	  indigenous	  ways	  of	  being	  and	  knowing	  can’t	  take	  place	  in	  their	  absence.	  In	  Ancient	   and	  Modern	   a	  more	   considered	   connection	   has	   the	   effect	   of	   ‘moving	   knowledge	  around	   in	   different	   ways’:	   generating,	   cycling,	   extending	   into	   space	   and	   being	   in	   and	   of	   place.	  ‘Aboriginal	  philosophy	  is	  all	  about	  keeping	  things	  alive	  in	  their	  place’.	  (27)	  At	  times,	  connecting	  to	  stories	  in	  Ancient	  and	  Modern	  takes	  us	  on	  narrative	  rambles	  with	  undisclosed	  destinations;	  such	  as	  the	  story	  of	  another	  Ngarrindjerri,	  David	  Unaipon,	  whose	  head	  is	  on	  the	  fifty	  dollar	  note.	  This	  leads	  into	  having	  coffee	  with	  Clarrie	  Isaacs	  the	  morning	  The	  West	  Australian	  ran	  a	  humour	  story	  about	   his	   possible	   involvement	   in	   the	   decapitation	   of	   a	   Perth	   statue	   of	   the	   Aboriginal	  warrior,	  Yalngu,	  at	  the	  time	  his	  real	  head	  was	  being	  repatriated.	  (29–42)	  I	  was	  initially	  reluctant	  to	  set	  off	  without	  my	   accustomed	   scholar’s	   orienteering	   kit,	   but	   unexpected	   things	   can	   happen	   once	   you	  stop	  keeping	  watch	  for	  the	  signposts	  of	  discipline.	  Nevertheless	  at	  one	  point	   I	  seemed	  to	  miss	  a	  turn,	  possibly	   from	  not	  being	  a	  philosopher.	   I	  got	   lost	   in	   what	   seemed	   like	   a	   trail	   of	   undisciplined	   connections.	   Muecke	   analyses	   the	  participation	   of	   David	   Unaipon	   and	   a	   troupe	   of	   eleven	   other	   Ngarrindjerri	   men	   at	   the	   Hobart	  Carnival	  in	  1910.	  He	  indicates	  the	  direction	  of	  his	  argument	  with	  a	  quote	  from	  Michael	  Taussig:	  ‘In	  times	   past	   the	   shamans	   warded	   off	   danger	   by	   means	   of	   images	   imitating	   that	   danger’.	   (29)	  Mimesis	   is	   threaded	   through	   the	   account	   and	   then	   its	   transformative	   potential	   is	   extrapolated	  from	  the	  Unaipon	  instance	  and	  into	  the	  writing	  of	  performative	  history.	  	  Muecke	  sees	  the	  Hobart	  carnival,	  an	  outdoors	  and	  popular	  pageant,	  as	  a	  ‘perfect	  medium’	  for	  the	  twelve	  Ngarrindjerri	  to	  ‘integrate’	  their	  ‘own	  style’	  of	  public	  moral	  persuasion.	  (31)	  However,	  as	   well	   as	   having	   ‘participated’	   in	   a	   march	   in	   which	   they	   appeared	   clad	   in	   furs—and	   were	  accordingly	   described	   by	   the	  Mercury	   as	   ‘genuine	   aboriginal’	   (31)—they	   also	   appeared	   indoors	  before	  white	  audiences	  as	  church	  preachers	  and	  choristers.	  (35)	  Unaipon	  was	  an	  impassioned	  and	  articulate	   advocate	   of	   Aboriginal	   rights.	   One	   of	   the	   Ngarrindjerri,	   possibly	   Unaipon,	   thrashes	   a	  white	  traveller	  at	  a	  game	  of	  draughts.	  Muecke	  notes	  that	  he	  ‘beat	  the	  whitefella	  at	  his	  own	  game’.	  (34)	  Muecke	  appreciates	  that	  Unaipon’s	  mimeticism	  is	  how	  he	  was	  brought	  up,	  his	  performances	  were	  part	  of	  ‘growing’	  a	  new	  culture	  for	  his	  people	  and	  he	  rightly	  comments,	  ‘To	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	   intended	   to	   prove	   the	   point	   that	   Aboriginal	   people	   can	   do	   it	   too,	   his	   cultivation	   becomes	   a	  culture	   brought	   into	   battle	   against	   the	   primitivising	   and	   historicizing	   tendencies	   to	   keep	   the	  natives	  in	  their	  place’.	  (37)	  But	  then	  Muecke	  is	  inspired	  to	  allow	  mimeticism	  into	  his	  own	  writing	  to	   thwart	   the	   potential	   for	   ‘inquisitive	   white	   attendants’	   and	   because	   our	   history	   needs	   to	   be	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something	  beyond	  representation	  and	  should	  delve	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  magic,	  poetics	  and	  creating	  illusion.	  Muecke	  adopts	  mimicry	  as	  a	  technique	  in	  his	  historical	  performance	  of	  Unaipon’s	  story.	  He	  argues	  that	  this	  adoption	  of	  mimicry	  from	  Unaipon’s	  mimicry	  is	  about	  exploring	  the	  power	  of	  appearances	  as	  distinct	  from	  seeking	  the	  essence	  of	  Unaipon.	  Although	   I’ve	   a	   way	   to	   go	   with	   it,	   mimesis	   strikes	  me	   as	   a	   delicate	   theoretical	   apparatus,	  particularly	  in	  connection	  to	  indigenous	  Australians,	  because	  white	  Australians,	  from	  Mrs	  Aeneas	  Gunn,	  to	  Daisy	  Bates,	  the	  Chauvels	  and	  Douglas	  Lockwood,	  have	  been	  very	  ‘inquisitive	  attendants’	  to	   Aborigines’	   ‘remarkable	   powers	   of	   divination	   and	   mimicry’.8	   From	   the	   earliest	   settlers	  Aborigines	  were	  known	  for	  their	  uncanny	  and	  innate	  mimicry	  and,	  significantly,	  white	  Australians	  hoped	  it	  would	  facilitate	  their	  assimilation.	  Critical	  engagement	  with	  mimesis	  needs	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  this	  context	  of	  white	  popular	  inquisitiveness	  about	  Aboriginal	  mimicry	  and	  its	  value	  in	  their	  minds	  for	  the	  aims	  of	  assimilation.	  Muecke	  is	  interested	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  mimesis	  in	  performative	  history	  to	  bring	  ‘the	  subject	  to	  life	   again’,	   and	   of	   course	   in	   ‘the	   power	   of	   the	   copy	   to	   influence	   what	   it	   is	   a	   copy	   of’.	   (38)	   He	  advocates	   ‘attention	   to	   performance,	   the	  mimetic	   power	   of	   history	   enacted	   and	   re-­‐enacted.	   Far	  from	   being	   a	   primitivist	   appropriation	   of	   Aboriginality	   as	   some	   critics	   have	   suggested,	   it	   is	  designed	  to	  show	  the	  operation	  of	  “primitive”	  mimeticism	  in	  everybody’s	  versions	  of	  modernity’.	  (40)	  Without	  wanting	   to	  quibble	  about	   footnotes,	   an	   indication	  of	  who	   the	  critics	  are	  might	  have	  helped	  me	  regain	  my	  bearings,	  because	  within	  Unaipon’s	  mimicry	  and	  then	  Muecke’s	  adoption	  of	  mimicry	   into	   the	   writing	   of	   history,	   I	   still	   couldn’t	   place	   this	   operation.	   Nevertheless,	   the	  collaborative	  research	  project	  informing	  this	  discussion	  is	  something	  to	  look	  forward	  to.	  For	  all	  its	  twists	  and	  turns	  the	  book’s	  whimsy	  and	  reverie	  is	  beautiful	  and	  sometimes	  funny.	  In	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  representationalism	  of	  anthropologist	  WEH	  Stanner,	  Muecke	  writes:	  	  Stanner	  will	  later	  claim	  that	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  there	  is	  no	  Aboriginal	  philosophy	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  tradition	  of	  intellectual	  detachment.	  True,	  there	  isn’t	  an	  Aboriginal	  philosopher	  standing	  to	  one	  side	  observing	  this	  ceremony,	  stroking	  his	  beard	  and	  saying,	  ‘Hmm,	  yes,	  definite	  sexual	  symbolism	  going	  on	  here.’	  That’s	  the	  anthropologist’s	  job.	  And	  we	  would	  have	  to	  reverse	  the	  gaze	  and	  ask	  Stanner	  just	  how	  intellectually	  detached	  he	  was	  about	  his	  own	  sacred	  rituals	  (seminars,	  advancements	  of	  science).	  Just	  how	  seriously	  was	  he	  taking	  himself.9	  	  Muecke’s	  coda	  is	  a	  perplexing	  dream	  whose	  meaning	  he	  leaves	  hanging.	  Two	  Aboriginal	  women	  students	  perform	  presentations.	  The	  first	  traces	  pathways	  with	  her	  bare	  feet	  through	  a	  classroom	  floor	   that	   has	   transformed	   into	   pebbles.	   Muecke	   wanted	   to	   photograph	   her	   work,	   but	   she	  smoothed	   them	   over.	   The	   second	   student	   carried	   in	   stones,	   in	   slabs	   and	   fragments,	   while	  repeating	   text	   in	   traditional	   language.	   In	   the	   dream	  Muecke	   remembers	   an	   email	   he’d	   received	  from	  one	  of	  the	  students	  asking	  to	  make	  her	  presentation	  in	  unusual	  form.	  He	  recalls	  that	  he’d	  put	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the	  email	  aside	  because	  it	  presented	  a	  difficulty;	  he	  did	  not	  reply	  and	  finally	   it	  slipped	  his	  mind.	  (178)	  It	  seems	  such	  a	  strange	  account	  of	  the	  dream-­‐workings	  of	  an	  author	  committed	  to	  dialogue	  but	  not	  replying,	  interested	  in	  indigenous	  knowledges	  and	  their	  disclosure	  but	  not	  understanding	  the	   language,	  watching	   the	   traces	   smoothed	   over.	   Along	  with	   Huggins,	   Gloria	   Brennan	   and	   the	  Mungamunga	  women,	  it	  is	  a	  rare	  acknowledgment	  of	  women	  being	  custodians	  of	  that	  knowledge,	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  elusive	  and	  transient;	  the	  pebbles	  and	  slabs	  are	  displaced.	  No	   conclusion	   is	   drawn,	   which	   is	   telling	   of	   a	   book	   that	   generates	   a	   range	   of	   interpretive	  possibilities.	   It	   animates,	   perhaps,	   the	   slippage	  of	  mind	   required	  of	  white	  philosophers,	   of	   their	  own	  imaginings,	  in	  order	  to	  mindfully	  connect	  to	  the	  unusual	  forms	  of	  indigenous	  philosophy.	  —	  Liz	  Conor	  is	  a	  postdoctoral	  research	  fellow	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  English	  with	  Cultural	  Studies	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Melbourne.	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